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CONSTITUTIONAL

CASE NOTES

LAW-TAx EXEMPTION-THE

LEGISLATURE

MAY NOT VALIDLY EXEMPT THE PROPERTY OF A NONPROFIT WATER

SUPPLY CORPORATION FROM TAXATION. Leander Independent School

District v. Cedar Park Water Supply Corporation, 479 S.W.2d 908
(Tex. Sup. 1972).
Cedar Park Water Supply Corporation brought suit against Leander
Independent School District seeking a declaratory judgment exempting
Cedar Park's property from taxation. The trial court granted Leander's
motion for summary judgment. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed
the decision of the trial court and declared that the property was exempt.' In its decision, the court held that article 7150, section 23, Texas
2
Revised Civil Statutes was controlling.
All real and personal property owned by a non-profit water supply

corporation which is reasonably necessary for, and is used in, the
operation of the corporation in the acquisition, storage, transportation, sale and distribution of water is exempt from taxation. 8

The court went on to note that the 61st Legislature enacted article 7150
within the authority granted by Article VIII, Section 2, of the Texas
Constitution, thus, article 7150 was constitutional. 4 Held-Reversed.
The legislature may not validly exempt the property of a non-profit

water supply corporation from taxation.5 "[A] literal reading of Article
VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution indicates that the Legislature has no
power to exempt the property of a privately owned water supply corporation."6
Article VIII, Section 2, of the Texas Constitution delineates the authority of the legislature to exempt certain property from taxation.
All occupation taxes shall be equal and uniform upon the same
class of subjects within the limits of the authority levying the tax;
but the legislature may, by general laws, exempt from taxation
public property used for public purposes . . . [however] all laws

exempting property from taxation other than the property above
1 Cedar Park Water Supply Corp. v. Leander Ind. School Dist., 469 S.W.2d 19 (rex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1971), rev'd, 479 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Sup. 1972).
2 Id.

3 Tax. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 7150, § 23 (Supp. 1969).
4 Cedar Park Water Supply Corp. v. Leander Ind. School Dist., 469 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1971): "The Legislature may, pursuant to this section [TEx. CONST. art.
VIII, § 2] governing exemptions from taxation, provide for exemption from taxation of
property which is privately owned if such property is devoted to a purpose which gives it
public character."
5 Leander Ind. School Dist. v. Cedar Park Water Supply Corp., 479 S.W.2d 908 (Tex.
Sup. 1972).
6Id. at 910.
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mentioned [in this section] shall be null and void.7 (Emphasis
added.)
However, while Article VIII, Section 2, authorizes legislative exemptions, Article XI, Section 9, specifically enumerates property which shall
automatically be tax exempt; hence, it is self-executing. Article XI,
Section 9, provides:
The property of counties, cities and towns, owned and held only
for public purposes, such as public buildings and the sites therefor,
fire engines and the furniture thereof, and all property used, or
intended for extinguishing fires, public grounds and all other
property devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public
shall be exempt from forced sale and from taxation, provided,
nothing herein shall prevent the enforcement of the vendors
lien,
8
the mechanics or builders lien, or other liens now existing.
The interpretation of each article and the duties of the courts to harmonize the two provisions have precipitated two distinct lines of cases.
The Texas Supreme Court first established a duality approach in ap.
plication of these constitutional provisions in 1888 in Daugherty v.
Thompson.9 Daugherty concerned the validity of an ad valorem tax
imposed upon one holding under a ten year lease of school property
belonging to the county.' 0 In its decision upholding a permanent injunction to enjoin the collection of taxes on this leasehold, the court
reaffirmed the constitutionality of a statute" exempting educational
institutions from taxation.
7 TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 2. The entire text of art. VIII, § 2 is included here for purposes of further reference:
All occupation taxes shall be equal and uniform upon the same class of subjects within
the limits of the authority levying the tax; but the legislature may, by general laws,
exempt from taxation public property used for public purposes; actual places or [of]
religious worship, also any property owned by a church or by a strictly religious
society for the exclusive use as a dwelling place for the ministry of such church or
religious society, . ... provided that such exemption shall not extend to more property than is reasonably necessary for a dwelling place and in no event more than one
acre of land; places of burial not held for private or corporate profit; all buildings
used exclusively and owned by persons or associations of persons for school purposes
and the necessary furniture of all schools and property used exclusively and reasonably necessary in conducting any association engaged in promoting the religious,
educational and physical development of boys, girls, young men or young women operating under a State or National organization of like character; also the endowment
funds of such institutions of learning and religion not used with a view to profit; and
when the same are invested in bonds or mortgages, or in land or other property which
has been and shall hereafter be bought in by such institutions under foreclosure sales
made to satisfy or protect such bonds or mortgages, that such exemption of such land
and property shall continue only for two years after the purchase of the same at such
sale by such institutions and no longer, and institutions of purely public charity; and
all laws exempting property from taxation other than the property above mentioned
shall be null and void.
s TEx. CONST. art. XI, § 9 (emphasis added).
971 Tex. 192, 9 S.W. 99 (1888).
10 Id.
1lTex. Laws 1876, ch. 157, § 5, at 276, 8 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1112 (1898). This
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As before said, section 2, art. 8, of the constitution, gave to the
legislature the power to exempt property held in private ownership, but used for purposes which give to it a public character.
Section 9, of article 11, however, exempts from taxation "property
of counties, cities, and towns owned and held only for public purposes, such as public buildings and sites therefor ...

and all other

' ' 12
property devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public.

The definition of "public property used for public purposes" which
evolved from the Daugherty interpretation of Article VIII, Section 2,
was reinforced in City of Beaumont v. Fertitta.3 In this case the
supreme court dealt with the issue of the applicability of tax exemptions to lessees of city-owned property. 1 The court, in its construction
of Article XI, Section 9, stated that "[ilt appears that the use to which
the property itself is put is of primary importance in making the
determination.' 15
[T]he very wording of this constitutional provision indicates that
they [the counties, cities, and towns] could own property which
might not be held only for public purposes or might not be put to
a public use exclusively and would not be covered by the exemption.'6
In Galveston Wharf Co. v. City of Galveston,'7 Chief Justice Stayton
consistently followed the rationale of his opinion in Daugherty. It was
held that wharf property owned by the city and open to all people and
vessels was public property, regardless of the compensation charged for
its use. Article XI, Section 9, was loosely construed when Chief Justice
Stayton noted that:
[T]he enumeration of certain things in the section of the constitution quoted (Art. XI, Sec. 9), as exempt from taxation, was not
intended to operate as a declaration that things not enumerated
were subject; but simply to indicate the character of things, and
the uses to which they must be appropriated, in order to be
entitled to the exemption.'
Chief Justice Phillips also rejected a strict interpretation in Corporation of San Felipe de Austin v. State:' 9
statute provided for exemption from taxation for public schools, colleges, houses of worship, and land or buildings owned by persons or associations of persons and used exclusively for school purposes or buildings belonging to institutions of public charity.
1271 Tex. 192, 201, 9 S.W. 99, 102 (1888).
13415 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
14 Id.
15 Id. at 908.
16 Id. at 908.
1763 Tex. 14 (1884).
18 Id. at 23.
19 111 Tex. 108, 229 S.W. 845 (1921). The court held that land granted by the Mexican

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 4 [2022], No. 2, Art. 12

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4

The test is not whether the property is used for governmental
purposes. That is not the language of the Constitution. This Court
has never adopted that narrow limitation and the weight of authority is opposed to it. Much public property of municipalities
exempt from taxation has, and can have, no governmental20 use.
The test is whether it is devoted exclusively to a public use.
The court adopted a similar test of "public property" in its determination that municipally owned rural electrification lines were tax
exempt. "In determining whether or not public property is used for a
public purpose the test appears to be whether it is used primarily for
'21
health, comfort, and welfare of the public."
The trend of expanding the definition of "public property used for
public purposes" culminated in the 1945 decision in Lower Colorado
River Authority v. Chemical Bank & Trust. Co. 22 Here, the court, in
applying Article XI, Section 9, concluded that, although this governmental agency [the LCRA] was not municipally or county-owned and
despite the fact that it charged set rates for services, the LCRA benefited the public, hence it was "public property devoted exclusively to
public use."' 23 The court observed that it was under no "obligation...
to harmonize Article XI, Sec. 9, with Art. VIII, Sec. 2 ...

[since] [t]hat

duty ... was performed for us a long time ago by Chief Justice Stayton
24
... in Daugherty.... "
Chief Justice Alexander's vigorous dissent to this decision was indicative of the line of authority holding contrary to these interpretations.
Obviously, the people in adopting these.., provisions must have
intended that some public property used for public purposes
should be exempt from taxation automatically, while other public
property used for public purposes might be exempted or taxed
according to the will of the Legislature. 25
Furthermore, Chief Justice Alexander castigated the majority for
shirking its duty-"the duty of the Court to construe the Constitution
as a whole and to harmonize its provisions, and, if possible, give effect
to each and every provision thereof. ' ' 2 The Chief Justice contended
Government to the town of San Felipe de Austin for use by its inhabitants as timber and
grazing land was tax exempt because it was devoted exclusively to public use.
20 Id. at 111, 229 S.W. at 847 (emphasis added); accord, United States v. 120,000 Acres of
Land, 50 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Tex. 1943).
21 A. & M. Consol. Ind. School Dist. v. Bryan, 143 Tex. 348, 351, 184 S.W.2d 914, 915
(1945). Justice Alexander delivered the majority opinion in January 1945.
22 144 Tex. 326, 190 S.W.2d 48 (1945).
23 Id. at 331, 190 S.W.2d at 50.
24 Id. at 333, 190 S.W.2d at 51.
25 Id. at 335, 190 S.W.2d at 52. Note that this view is contrary to Chief Justice Alexander's opinion referred to in note 21 which was delivered just nine months prior.
26 Id. at 337, 190 S.W.2d at 53.
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that the examples of property held for public purposes as cited in Article XI, Section 9, were illustrative of the nature of the property
exempted.27 "They do not embrace property used for commercial
purposes, such as generators and distributing lines used in manufacturing and distributing a commodity for sale to the public." 28
In rejecting the Daugherty view adopted by the court, Chief Justice
Alexander commented on the provision of Article XI, Section 9, of the
Texas Constitution exempting all other property devoted exclusively
to the use and benefit of the public from taxation. "The added provision enlarged the scope only so as to include other property of the same
general classification as that previously dealt with and illustrated by
29
examples given, and nothing more."
The line of authority which supports a more strict construction of
the two provisions is substantially in accord with the aforementioned
dissent in Lower Colorado River Authority and Justice Walker's dis3 0 In his opinion,
sent in City of Beaumont v. Fertitta.
he rejects the
contention of the court that Article VIII, Section 2, serves to exempt
municipal property which is not used or held for public purposes. 31
In my opinion the support and comfort which the majority seems
to find in quoted excerpts from the opinions in Daugherty and
Lower Colorado River Authority v. Chemical Bank & Trust
Co. are illusory at best. The two decisions are not nearly as broad
as they are now interpreted.8 2
The supreme court indirectly noted that the weight of authority was
shifting towards a narrower definition of the two provisions. In the
instant case, the court cites Chief Justice Stayton's opinion 3 in St.
Edwards University v. Morris,3 4 which appears to contrast with the
previous opinions in Galveston Wharf and Daugherty. In St. Edwards
the Chief Justice pronounced that it was error to exempt all the land
owned by a private corporation, even though a portion of the land was
used for school purposes. 3 He stated that under Article VIII, Section 2,
"[i]t cannot be claimed that the property ... is public property used
27 Id. at 337, 190 S.W.2d at 53. ". . . such as public buildings and sites therefor. Fire
engines and the furniture thereof, and all property used, or intended for extinguishing
fires, public grounds, etc." (Court's emphasis.)
28 Id. at 337, 190 S.W.2d at 53 (emphasis added).
29 Id. at 337, 190 S.W.2d at 54.
30415 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Sup. 1967) (dissenting opinion); accord, Texas Turnpike Co.
v. Dallas Co., 153 Tex. 474, 271 S.W.2d 400 (1954); cf. City of Abilene v. State, 113 S.W.2d
631 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1938, writ dism'd). Contra, State v. City of Beaumont, 161
S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1942, no writ).
81415 S.W.2d 902, 913 (Tex. Sup. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
32d. at 915 (citation omitted).
33 Leander Ind. School Dist. v. Cedar Park Water Supply Corp., 479 S.W.2d 908, 912
(Tex. Sup. 1972).
34 82 Tex. 1, 17 S.W. 512 (1891).
85 Id.
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for public purposes, for to give it such character it is believed that the
ownership should be in the state or some of its municipal subdivisions ...

36

This reasoning is not dissimilar to that of the court in deciding the
instant case. As stated earlier, Cedar Park was an incorporated water
supply company which furnished service to residents in rural communities upon payment of a fifty dollar fee. The corporation, however,
paid no dividends and operated on a nonprofit basis.37 It clearly satisfied the requisites of the recently enacted article 7150, section 238
which served to exempt privately-owned water supply companies from
taxation. Prior to the passage of article 7150, section 23,39 the legislature proposed an amendment to Article VIII, Section 2, of the Texas
Constitution which would have authorized the legislature to exempt
nonprofit water supply corporations from taxation.40 This amendment,
however, failed to pass in the general elections. The contention of the
counsel for the Leander School District was that this proposed amendment was tantamount to an admission by the legislators that they
lacked the constitutional authority to enact article 7150, section 23. The
court in the instant case dismissed this contention by stating: "In our
opinion the Legislature intended to grant the exemption if it had the
power to do so and proposed the constitutional amendment to undergird the statute in the event that later proved necessary. ' '41 In effect, the
court is holding that the passage of the proposed amendment was not
a prerequisite for the execution of article 7150, section 23 as Leander
maintained. Such was not the intent of the legislature. 42 This court
states that it is not bound by the Beaumont interpretation of the
Daugherty opinion; in fact, the court rejects it out of hand:
In one of our more recent opinions, it was said in passing that the
first sentence in the preceding quotation is a clear definition of
what is meant by "public property used for public purposes" in Art.
VIII, Sec. 2. City of Beaumont v. Fertitta....

Upon further con-

sideration of the matter, we have concluded that this is not a
proper construction of the opinion in Daugherty. There the Court
was not attempting to define "public property used for public
purposes," and it was not concerned with the power of the Legislature to exempt any privately owned property used for a public
purpose. It was concerned with the taxation of public school land
6 Id. at 3, 17 S.W. at 512.
3T Leander Ind. School Dist. v. Cedar Park Water
(Tex. Sup. 1972).
38 TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7150, § 23 (Supp.
89 Id.
40 Proposed Amendment to TEx. CONST. art. VIII,
41 Leander Ind. School Dist. v. Cedar Park Water
(Tex. Sup. 1972).

Supply Corp., 479 S.W.2d 908, 909
1969).
§ 2, TEx. S.J.R. 6 (1969).
Supply Corp., 479 S.W.2d 908, 910

42 Id.
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owned by43 a county but held and used under a lease for private

purposes.

The court asserts that, "... the quoted excerpts from the opinion in
Daugherty [".... Section 2, Art. 8 ... gave to the Legislature power to

exempt property held in private ownership but used for purposes
which give to it a public character. 44 ] are simply general observations
concerning Art. VIII, Sec. 2, and cannot properly be regarded as a
definition of the words 'public property used for public purposes,' ',45
46
and regards these "general observations" as "gratuitous statements.
The court recognizes the interpretations in the decision of Lower
ColoradoRiver Authority v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co. 47 and attempts

to reconcile the ensuing conflicts. The court maintains that, while
Lower Colorado River Authority holds that Article XI, Section 9, exempts all public property used for public purposes even though not
owned by a county, city, or town, such is not the construction given to
Article VIII, Section 2. In differentiating between the two articles, the
court submits that the intention of the framers of the Texas Constitution was:
(1) that Art. XI, Sec. 9, would apply only to property owned by
counties, cities, and towns, and would operate to exempt the property of these political subdivisions provided it was devoted exclusively to a public use; and (2) that other property publicly
owned and used for a public purpose might be exempted by the
Legislature under the provisions of Art. VIII, Sec. 2.48
The court proceeds to point out, that, although the majority in Lower
Colorado River Authority felt no obligation to "harmonize the two
sections," this court feels duty bound to resolve the contrasting interpretations of the provisions in such a manner as to give effect to each
provision. 49 Turning to the doctrines advocated by those cases broadly
construing the provisions and those propounding the "public use" test,
the court, in referring to Article VIII, Section 2, agrees with the prior
authorities that "[i]t is essential . . . that the property be used for
public purposes but that in itself is not enough." 50 The court supplements this requirement when it emphatically states:
Id. at 911, 912.
44 71 Tex. 192, 201, 9 S.W. 99, 102 (1888).
45 Leander Ind. School Dist. v. Cedar Park Water Supply Corp., 479 S.W.2d 908, 912
('rex. Sup. 1972).
46 Id. at 912.
47 144 Tex. 326, 190 S.W.2d 48 (1945).
48 Leander Ind. School Dist. v. Cedar Park Water Supply Corp., 479 S.W.2d 908, 911
(1rex. Sup. 1972).
49 Id. at 911.
50 Id. at 912 (emphasis added).
43
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The property must, wholly apartfrom its use, be "public property."
In our opinion this means public ownership, and the Texas courts
have never held to the contrary. We accordingly now hold that the
clause in question authorizes the Legislature to exempt only publicly owned property used for public purposes. 51
As a result of the determination, the court now holds that the legislature does not have the authority to exempt privately-owned property,
such as non-profit water supply companies, and any statute attempting
to do so is to be held "null and void." 52 Consequently, article 7150, sec5
tion 23 is held unconstitutional as violative of Article VIII, Section 2.3
Upon arriving at this decision, the court elaborates on the precedent
set by the Lower Colorado River Authority. The opinion in the instant
case denounces any effect on Article VIII, Section 2, by the construction
in Lower Colorado River Authority. Moreover, it confines the application of the Lower Colorado River Authority interpretation to Article
XI, Section 9.54 It seems strange, however, that the majority in the
instant case firmly rejects the doctrine presented in Daugherty and the
Beaumont construction of that doctrine, but is hesitant to overrule the
Lower Colorado River Authority decision with which it strongly disagrees.
According to our present decision, the framers of the Constitution
provided in Art. VIII, Sec. 2, that the Legislature might exempt
public property used for public purposes. According to the holding
in Lower Colorado River Authority, they provided in Art. XI,
Sec. 9, that all such property would be automatically exempt from
taxation, and we have done nothing more to harmonize the two
sections than was done by the Court in that case. As pointed out
earlier in this opinion, however, we believe they could have been
harmonized in the beginning. The holding in Lower Colorado
River Authority will not be disturbed since it is now firmly embedded in our jurisprudence, but we do not feel compelled by the
Constitution to adopt what we regard as an erroneous interpretation of a clause in an entirely different section.55
The instant case embodies the views of those decisions strictly construing the provisions in question, yet this court only deems it necessary to
apply these doctrines to Article VIII, Section 2. The reluctance of the
court to assert its construction of the "public property" clause to both
provisions and the unwillingness of the court to overturn the Lower
51Id. at 912 (emphasis added).
52 TEx. CONsr. art. VIII, § 2.
53 Leander Ind. School Dist. v. Cedar Park Water Supply Corp., 479 S.W.2d 908, 912
(Tex. Sup. 1972).
54Id. at 913.
55 Id. at 912, 913 (emphasis added).
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